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Almost  four  years  have  passed  since  the  major 
nations  of  the  world  decided  to  let  their  currencies 
float.,  jointly  or  individually.  During  this  period 
foreign  exchange  rates  have  eshibitecl  sharp  move- 
ments,  examples  being  the  recent  precipitous  fall  of 
the  international  value  of  the  British  pound,  the 
Italian  lira,  and  the  Mexican  peso  as  well  as  sharp 
gyrations  in  the  U.  S.  dollar  relative  to  the  German 
deutschemark. 
Among  the  explanations  that  have  been  advanced 
to  account  for  these  movements  is  the  monetarist 
approach,  which  views  national  monetary  policies  as 
the  primary  factor  directly  or  indirectly  influencing 
exchange  rates.  -4s usually  presented,  the  monetarist 
approach  emphasizes  that  the  exchange  rate  is deter- 
mined  by  demands  for  and  supplies  of  national  cur- 
rencies;  that  it  is  subject  to  the  same  influences  as 
other  asset  prices  (e.g.,  stock  prices)  ; that  it  is  par- 
ticularly  sensitive  to  expectations  about  future  es- 
change  rates,  expectations  that  are  heavily  condi- 
tioned  by  recent  and  current  tnonetary  policies;  and 
finally  that  it  reflects  all  available  information  about 
the  two  currencies  and  therefore  alters  in  response  to 
new  information  about  changed  circumstances.  In 
accord  with  this  view,  monetarists  argue  that  one 
reason  for  the  observed  volatility  of  exchange  rates  is 
that  monetary  policies  of  major  nations  have  been 
variable  and  erratic.  Policy  changes,  so the  argument 
goes,  have  induced  asset  holders  to  alter  their  espec- 
tations  of  future  exchange  rates,  thereby  resulting  in 
large  movements  in current  exchange  rates.  A  second 
factor  allegedly  contributing  to  exchange  rate  move- 
ments  is lack  of policy  coordination  among  nations  as 
manifested  by  divergent  rates  of  monetary  growth. 
Monetarists  contend  that  this  factor  produces  inter- 
national  differential  inflation  rates  that  are  a primary 
source  of  e&?ange  rate  variability.  It  follows~ 
therefore,  that  the  way  to  achieve  exchange  rate 
stability  is  for  countries  to  abandon  monetary  fine- 
tuning  for  policy  rules  calling  for  uniform  constant 
rates  of  monetary  growth  per  unit  of  trend  output. 
If  the  foregoin  g  monetarist  view  sounds  familiar, 
it  is probably  because  it  appears  so frequently  in  the 
financial  journals  and  the  popular  press.  For  ex- 
ample,  Milton  Friedman  regularly  espouses  it  in  his 
No~~~eek  column,  as  do  the  editors  of  the  Wall 
Street  Journal  and  analysts  writing  in  Citibank’s 
Montlzly  Economic  Letter.  Rarely,  however,  do 
these  commentators  mention  the  analytical  frame- 
work  underlying  their  analysis,  although  that  frame- 
work  is a  standard  part  of  the  monetarist  approach.’ 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  present  one  ver- 
sion  of  this  framework  and  to  discuss  its  public 
policy  implications.  The  framework  is represented  in 
the  form  of  a  simple  two-country,  seven-equation 
expository  model  of  exchange  rate  determination.” 
This  model  has  a  long  history  dating  back  at  least 
175 years.  A rudimentary  version  of  it was first  used 
by David  Ricardo,  John  Wheatley,  and  other  classical 
economists  to  explain  the  fall  of  the  paper  pound 
following  Britain’s  suspension  of  convertibility  of 
notes  into  bullion  at  a  fised  price  during  the  Ka- 
poleonic  wars.  Later  it was  employed  by the  Swedish 
economist  Gustav  Cnssel  to  explain  the  fall  of  the 
German  mark  during  World  War  I  and  afterward 
in  the  famous  hyperinflation  episode  of  the  early 
1920’s.  In  fact,  the  model  in  one  form  or  another 
has  been  at  the  center  of  monetarist  policy  discussion 
and  analysis  whenever  flexible  exchange  rates  have 
been  in  operation.3  Applied  to  recent  experience, 
the  model  is  capable  of  explaining  why  exchange 
rates  have  been  so  volatile  and  why  espectational  in- 
fluences  have  caused  them  to  deviate  from  levels  sug- 
gested  by  underlying  rates  of  monetary  and  income 
growth  alone. 
i This  framework  has  been  thorouahly  developed  in  the  seholarb  if 
not  the  ~omlar,  literature.  See  in  particular  the  paners  cited’  in 
the  list  of  references  at  the  end  of  this  article.  The  present  article 
draws  heavily  from  these  sources. 
2 The  model  presented  here  is  adapted  from  similar  models  developed 
by  Bilson  t-1.21,  Dornbusch  [3],  F’renkel  [4],  Fry  ES],  Magee  [G-J, 
and  Mussa  [73. 
“See  Frenkel  [4]  and  Myhrman  [S],  especially  the  latter.  for  a 
discussion  of  the  role  of  the  monetarist  approach  in  earlier  exchange 
rate  debates. 
FEDERAL  RESERVE  BANK  OF  RICHMOND  3 Key  Propositions  Central  to  the  model  are  six 
ingred’ients  that  should  be  acknowledged  at  the  out- 
set.  These  include  (1)  the  quantity  theory  of money, 
(2)  the  purchasing  power  parity  doctrine,  (3)  the 
interest  rate  parity  concept,  (4)  the  Fisher  relation- 
ship  (named  for  the  economist  who  first  formulated 
it)  between  nominal  and  real  interest  rates,  (5)  a 
monetarist  expectations-formation  hypothesis,  and 
(6)  the  efficient  markets  hypothesis.  The  quan- 
tity  theory  states  that  the  price  level  clears  the 
market  for  money  balances  by  bringing  the  real 
(price-deflated)  value  of  the  nominal  money  stock 
into  equality  with  the  real  demand  for  it.  The  pur- 
chasing  power  parity  doctrine  states  that  the  equilib- 
rium  exchange  rate  is  such  that  a  unit  of  a  given 
currency  commands  the  same  quantity  of  goods  and 
services  abroad  when  converted  into  the  other  cur- 
rency  as  it  commands  at  home.  This  implies  that  the 
buying  powers  of  the  two  currencies  are  the  same 
when  expressed  in  terms  of  a  common  unit  at  the 
equilibrium  rate  of  exchange.  Such  purchasing 
power  equalization  eliminates  profitable  opportunities 
for  commodity  arbitrage,  thereby  insuring  that  exist- 
ing  stocks  of national  currencies  will  be  willingly  held 
and  that  the  markets  for  real  cash  balances  in  both 
countries  will  clear  simultaneously.  Similar  reason- 
ing  underlies  the  interest  rate  parity  concept,  which 
states  that  the  real  rate  of  return  on  capital  assets 
tends  to  be  everywhere  the  same  and  independent  of 
the  currency  denomination  of  the  asset.  The  Fisher 
relationship  states  that  the  nominal  rate  of  interest 
equals  the  real  rate  of  interest  plus  the  expected  rate 
of  inflation.  Taken  together,  the  Fisher  relationship 
and  the  real  interest  rate  parity  concept  imply  that 
international  nominal  interest  rate  differentials  re- 
flect  differences  in  national  inflationary  prospects. 
The  monetarist  expectations-formation  hypothesis 
states  that  the  public  forms  expectations  of  the  future 
rate  of  inflation  on  the  basis  of  its  perception  of  the 
likely  future  course  of  monetary  policy.  Finally,  the 
efficient  markets  hypothesis  states  that  the  current 
market  price  of  an  asset  (e.g.,  foreign  eschange) 
reflects  all  available  information  and  adjusts  in- 
stantaneously  to  incorporate  new  information.  Con- 
stituting  the  central  analytical  core  of  the  mone- 
tarist  view  of  exchange  rate  determination,  the 
foregoing  propositions  are  incorporated  into  the 
model  presented  below. 
The  Model  and  Its  Components  The  model  itself 
consists  of  seven  equations  containing  the  following 
variables.  Let  M  be  the  nominal  money  stock  (as- 
sumed  to  be  exogenously  determined  by  the  central 
bank)  and  m  and  me  be  the  current  and  expected 
future  rates  of  growth  of  that  stock.  Furthermore, 
let  D  be  the  real  demand  for  money,  i.e.,  the  stock 
of  real  (price-deflated)  cash  balances  that  the  public 
desires  to  hold,  Y  the  esogenously  determined  level 
of  real  income,  i and  r  the  nominal  and  real  rates  of 
interest,  respectively,  and  -a  the  interest  elasticity  of 
demand  for  money.  Also  let  X  be  the  exchange  rate 
(defined  as  the  domestic  currency  price  of  a  unit  of 
foreign  currency),  P  be  the  price  level,  E  be  the 
expected  future  rate  of  inflation,  and  I  be  the  set  of 
information  upon  which  those  expectations  are  based. 
Asterisks  are  used  to  distinguish  foreign-country 
variables  from  home-country  variables,  and  the  sub- 
script  w  refers  to  the  entire  world  economy. 
The  foregoing  variables  are  linked  together  via 
the  following  relationships  : 
(1)  P  =  M/D  and  P*  =  M*/D* 
(2)  D  =  Yi-”  and  D*  =  Y*i*-a 
(3)  P  =  XP” 
(4)  i =  r  +  E  and  i*  =  r*  +  E* 
(5)  r=r  *  =  rW 
(6)  E  =  E(m’)  and  E*  =  Ed’ (me*) 
(7)  m” =  me( m,  I)  and  me*  =  me* (m*,  I*) 
The  first  relationship,  which  can  also  be written  as 
-M/P  =  D,  is the  monetary  equilibrium  equation.  It 
states  that  the  price  level  in  each  country  adjusts 
instantaneously  to  bring  the  real  value  of the  nominal 
money  stock  into  equality  with  the  real  demand  for 
it  thereby  clearin, m the  market  for  real  cash  balances. 
Kate  that  the  equation  also  implies  that,  given  the 
real  demand  for  money,  the  price  level  is  determined 
by  and  varies  equi-proportionally  with  the  nominal 
money  supply.  This  latter  result,  of  course,  is  the 
essence  of  the  quantity  theory  of  money. 
The  second  equation  is the  money  demand  function 
that  expresses  the  public’s  demand  for  real  cash 
balances  as  the  product  of  two  variables,  namely  real 
income  and  the  nominal  interest  rate.  The  former 
variable  is a proxy  for  the  volume  of real  transactions 
effected  with  the  aid  of  money  and  thus  represents 
the  transactions  demand  for  money.  By  contrast: 
the  interest  rate  variable  measures  the  opportunity 
cost  of  holding  money.  The  parameter  --a,  which 
appears  as the  exponent  on  the  interest  rate  variable, 
is  the  interest  elasticity  of  demand  for  money.  This 
parameter  measures  the  sensitivity  or  responsiveness 
of money  demand  to  changes  in  the  interest  rate  and 
is  assumed  to  be  a  negative  number  indicat:ing  that 
desired  real  cash  balances  vary  inversely  .with  the 
cost  of holding  them.  Kate  that  the  numerical  magni- 
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to  be  the  same  in  both  countries.  Xote  also  that  the 
income  elasticity  of demand  for  money,  as represented 
by  the  exponential  power  to  which  the  income  vari- 
able  is  raised,  is  assumed  to  possess  a  numerical 
value  of  unity. 
The  third  equation  of  the  model  is  the  purchasing 
power  parity  relationship  showing  how  national  price 
levels  are  linked  together  via  the  exchange  rate.  As 
indicated  by  the  equation,  prices  in  both  countries 
are  identical  when  converted  into  a  common  unit  at 
the  rate  of  exchange.  This  means  that  the  exchange 
rate  equalizes  such  (normalized)  price  levels  and,  by 
implication,  the  purchasing  power  of  both  moneys 
expressed  in  terms  of  a common  currency  unit.  This 
condition  of  equalized  purchasing  power  is  of  course 
necessary  if  the  two  national  money  stocks  are  to  be 
willingly  held  and  equilibrium  is  to  prevail  in  both 
money  markets  simultaneously.  If  the  purchasing 
powers  were  unequal,  people  would  demand  more 
of  the  high-  and  less  of  the  low-purchasing  power 
currency  on  the  market  for  foreign  exchange.  The 
resulting  excess  demand  for  the  former  and  the 
corresponding  excess  supply  of the  latter  would  cause 
the  exchange  rate  between  the  two  currencies  to 
adjust  until  purchasing  power  was  equalized  and 
both  money  stocks  were  willingly  held.  Sote  also 
that  the  purchasing  power  parity  equation  can  be 
rearranged  to  read  X  =  P/P*,  thus  corresponding 
to  the  monetarist  interpretation  of  the  exchange  rate 
as  the  relative  price  of  two  currencies,  i.e.,  as  the 
ratio  of the  foreign  currency’s  value  in terms  of goods 
to  the  domestic  currency’s  value  in  terms  of  goods. 
Since  the  value  of  a  unit  of  currency  in  terms  of  a 
composite  market  basket  of  commodities  is  the  in- 
verse  of  the  general  price  level  l/P,  it  follows  that 
the  relative  price  of  the  two  moneys  is  simply  the 
ratio  of  the  national  price  levels  as  indicated  by  the 
equation. 
The  fourth  and  fifth  equations  explain  the  deter- 
mination  of  the  nominal  and  real  rates  of  interest, 
respectively.  Following  Irving  Fisher,  the  fourth 
equation  defines  the  nominal  interest  rate  as  the  sum 
of  the  real  rate  of  interest  and  the  espected  future 
rate  of  inflation,  the  latter  variable  being  the  premium 
added  to  real  yields  to  prevent  their  erosion  by 
inflation.  The  fifth  equation  expresses  the  concept 
of  interest  rate  parity  according  to  which  real  yields 
on  assets  tend  to  be  the  same  everywhere  and  inde- 
pendent  of  the  currencies  in  which  denominated. 
Since  capital  is mobile  internationally,  i.e.,  foreigners 
can  purchase  domestic  securities  and  domestic  citi- 
zens  can  purchase  foreign  securities,  it  follows  that 
real  yield  equalization  is  necessary  if  all  asset  stocks 
are  to  be  willingly  held.  Accordingly,  the  equation 
states  that  reai  interest  rates  in  both  countries  are 
the  same  and  are  equal  to  a  given  constant  world 
rate.  Taken  together,  equations  4  and  5  imply  that 
international  nominal  interest  rate  differentials  reflect 
differences  in  expected  future  national  rates  of  infia- 
tion.  For  example,  if  the  market  expects  the  future 
rate  of  inflation  to  be  10 percent  in  the  U.  K.  and  3 
percent  in  the  U.  S.,  then  the  U.  K.  nominal  interest 
rate  will  be  7  percentage  points  above  the  corre- 
sponding  U.  S.  interest  rate. 
The  sixth  and  seventh  equations  together  explain 
how  the  public  forms  its  expectations  of  the  future 
rate  of  inflation.  These  inflationary  expectations 
constitute  the  anticipated  future  rates  of  depreciation 
of  money  hold5gs.  As  such,  they  enter  the  foreign 
and  domestic  demand  for  money  functions  via  the 
nominal  interes  rate  variables  and  thereby  play  an 
important  role  in  determining  the  exchange  rate. 
Regarding  the  iormation  of  price  anticipations,  equa- 
tion  6 expresses  the  monetarist  hypothesis  that  infla- 
tionary  expecta:ions  are  based  on  what  the  market 
believes  the  furare  rate  of  monetary  growth  will  be. 
This  of  course  means  that  the  market  must  forecast 
the  future  rate  of  monetary  growth  in  order  to  fore- 
cast  the  future  rate  of  inflation.  Equation  7 explains 
how  money  growth  forecasts  are  formulated.  The 
equation  embodies  the  assumption  that  people  formu- 
late  expectations  rationally,  using  all  available  infor- 
mation  in  predicting  future  monetary  growth,  and 
perhaps  revisizg  their  predictions  as new  information 
appears.  Relexxnt  information  includes  recent  policy 
pronouncements,  imminent  political  changes,  data  on 
past  and  current  behavior  of  the  monetary  aggre- 
gates,  past  observations  on  the  policymakers’  re- 
sponses  to  changes  in  the  economy,  and  the  like.  In 
equation  7,  the  information  input  is  represented  by 
two  variables,  namely  the  current  growth  rate  m  of 
the  monetary  a_  cgregates  and  all  other  information  I. 
The  model  does  not  attempt  to  explain  precisely  how 
money  growth  iorecasts  are  derived  from  this  infor- 
mation.  It  simply  assumes  that  the  forecasts  are 
somehow  made> that  they  constitute  the  most  accurate 
predictions  pol;Gble  given  the  state  of  the  market’s 
knowledge  and  the  availability  of  information,  and 
that  they  form  The basis  for  future  price  anticipations. 
Xote  that  the  substitution  of  equation  7  into  equa- 
tion  6  yields  the  efficient  market  hypothesis  that  the 
price  expectations  underlying  the  eschange  rate  re- 
flect  all  availabie  information  concerning  it. 
Linkages  and  Causation  Taken  together,  the 
foregoing  reiaeonships  constitute  a  simple  seven- 
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of exchange  rate  determination.  The  equations  imply 
two  unidirectional  channels  of  influence-one  direct, 
the  other  indirect-running  from  money  to  prices  to 
the  exchange  rate.  Regarding  the  former  channel, 
the  model  implies  that  the  actual  stock  of  money 
affects  prices  and  the  exchange  rate  directly  through 
the  monetary  equilibrium  and  purchasing  power 
parity  equations.  As  for  the  indirect  channel,  the 
model  implies  that  the  anticipated  future  growth 
rate  of money  influences  prices  and  the  exchange  rate 
indirectly  through  the  price  expectations  component 
of  the  nominal  interest  rate  variable  that  enters  the 
demand  for  money  functions.  More  specifically,  the 
model  postulates  the  following  causal  chain  : 
1.  Current  and  past  monetary  growth  rates  influ- 
ence predictions  of  future  monetary  growth. 
2.  Predictions  of  future  monetary  growth  deter- 
mine  the  expected  rate  of  inflation. 
3.  Given  the  real  rate  of  interest,  inflationary 
expectations  determine the nominal  rate of  interest. 
4.  The  latter  variable,  together  with  the  given 
level  of  real  income,  determines  the  demand  for 
money. 
5.  Given  the  demand  for  money,  the  nominal 
money  stock  determines  the  price  level. 
6.  Finally,  the  two  price  levels,  foreign  and  do- 
mestic,  together  determine  the  exchange  rate. 
Clearly,  in the  model  presented  above,  the  linkages 
run  from  money  (actual  and  anticipated)  to  prices 
to  the  exchange  rate.  Moreover,  all  variables  affect- 
ing  the  exchange  rate  do  so  through  monetary  chan- 
nels,  i.e.,  through  the  demand  for  or  supply  of money. 
In  this  sense,  money  demand  and  supply  may  be  said 
to  constitute  the  proxhmzte  determinants  of  the  ex- 
change  rate.  The  ultimate  determinants,  however, 
are  the  variables  that  underlie  and  determine  the 
monetary  factors  themselves,  namely  income,  interest 
rates,  price  expectations,  money  stocks  and  their 
growth  rates,  and  other  exogenous  information. 
Determinants  of  the  Exchange  Rate  To  show 
the  relationship  between  the  exchange  rate  and  its 
ultimate  determinants,  simply  substitute  equations 
2-7  into  equation  1 and  solve  for  the  exchange  rate. 
The  resulting  “reduced  form”  expression  is 
(8)  X  =  [M/M*]  [Ye/Y]  [i/i*]” 
or,  since  the  nominal  interest  rate  i is  the  sum  of the 
real  interest  rate  r  and  the  expected  rate  of  inflation 
Equation  S  (or  S’)  collects  the  determinants  of  ,the 
exchange  rate  into  three  groups,  namely  relative 
money  supplies,  relative  real  incomes,  and  relative 
nominal  interest  rates  comprised  of  a  fixed  real  rate 
component  and  a  variable  price  expectations  com- 
ponent.  Of  these  three  groups,  the  first  captures 
purely  monetary  influences  on  the  exchange  rate 
while  the  second  and  third  capture  real  and  expecta- 
tional  influences,  respectively. 
Regarding  the  first  group  of  determinants,  the 
equation  implies  that,  all  else  being  equal,  the  coun- 
try  with  the  faster  monetary  growth  will  find,  its 
currency  depreciating  on  the  foreign  exchanges.  As 
for  the  second  group  of  determinants,  the  equation 
predicts  that,  everything  else  being  equal,  the  country 
with  the  faster  growth  of  real  income  and  hence  real 
demand  for  money  will  experience  an  appreciating 
exchange  rate.  The  reason  is straightforward.  Given 
a  constant  nominal  money  stock,  a  real  income- 
induced  rise  in the  demand  for  it  necessitates  a f,all in 
the  price  level  to clear  the  market  for  money  balances. 
Since  the  required  price  fall  is  greater  in  the  high- 
than  in  the  low-growth  economy,  and  since  the  ex- 
change  rate  by  definition  is the  ratio  of  the  two  price 
levels,  it  follows  that  the  high-growth  country’s  cur- 
rency  will  be  appreciating  on  the  foreign  exchanges. 
Note  that  the  monetarist  conclusion  that  real  income 
growth  tends  to  appreciate  (lower)  the  exchange 
rate  contradicts  the  traditional  trade  balance  view 
that  income  growth  depreciates  the  exchange  rate  by 
inducing  a  rise  in  the  home  demand  for  imports. 
Finally,  as regards  the  third  group  of determinants, 
equation  S  (or  S’)  states  that,  everything  else  being 
equal,  the  country  with  the  relatively  worsening  in- 
flationary  prospects  will  have  a depreciating  exchange 
rate.  There  are  two  explanations  for  this.  First, 
people  will  desire  to  hold  relatively  less  of  the  cur- 
rency  whose  value  is  expected  to  fall  the  most. 
Therefore  the  relative  asset  demand  for  that  currency 
will  fall  and  the  exchange  rate  will  depreciate-as- 
suming,  of  course,  that  no  compensating  c:hanges 
occur  in  relative  money  supplies.  Second,  contracts 
will  tend  to  be  written  in  terms  of  the  curreacy  that 
is  expected  to  depreciate  the  least,  i.e.,  the  stronger 
currency  will  be preferred  to  the  weaker  as  an  inter- 
national  unit  of  account,  standard  of  value,  and  me- 
dium  of  exchange.  The  resulting  fall  in  the  relative 
transactions  demand  for  the  weaker  currency  will 
reduce  its  value  on  the  foreign  exchanges.  In  short, 
an  anticipated  depreciation  of  a  currency  will  reduce 
both  the  asset  and  transactions  demand  for  it  thereby 
helping  to  brin g  about  the  very  depreciation  that  is 
anticipated.  Note,  however,  that  such  anticipations 
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policies  (represented  by  the  \:ariables  m  and  111%  in 
equation  S’)  but  arc  strongly  conditioned  by  them. 
Within  the  contest  of the  model,  at  least,  a  history  of 
unrestrained  monetary  expansion  will  produce  expec- 
tations  oi  more  of  the  same  thereby  contributing  to 
the  weakness  of  the  currency  on  the  foreign  ex- 
changes.  Similarly,  ;L history  of  monetary  stab+ 
will  help  create  the  favorable  espectations  that  con- 
tribute  to  a  currency’s  strength. 
The  preceding  discussion  gives  some  inclication  oi 
the  importance  that  monetarists  attach  to  the  role  of 
expectations  in  determining  exchange  rates.  Corrc- 
sponding  to  this  emphasis  on  expectations,  equation 
S’  specifies  divergent  inflationary  prospects  as  the 
reason  why  exchange  rates  often  deviate  from  levels 
suggested  by  relative  money  stocks  and  real  incomes 
alone.  According  to  the  equation,  the  exchange  rate 
will  conform  to  the  level  suggested  by  the  under- 
lying  fundamentals  only  when  inflationary  expecta- 
tions  are  the  same  in  both  countries.  In  this  special 
case,  expected  future  rates  of  return  on  both  currency 
holdings  are  identical  and  cancel  out,  and  the  es- 
change  rate  is determined  solely  by the  fundamentals. 
In  all  other  cases?  however,  differential  expected 
inflation  rates  influence  the  eschange  rate  and  cause 
it  to  diverge  from  the  Ievel  predicted  by  the  funda- 
mentals,  i.e.,  relative  money  stocks  and  real  incomes. 
Equation  5’  would  be  of  little  interest  to  analysts 
and  policymakers  were  it  incapable  of  esplaining 
another  characteristic  of  recent  floating  rate  experi- 
ence,  namely  exchange  rate  Volatility.  Fortunately. 
however,  the  equation  can  account  for  suc11 behavior 
and  does  so  by  identifying  two  main  sources  of 
exchange  rate  movements.  The  first  is  shifts  in 
relative  money  supplies  (M/M*)  owing  to  monetary 
policies  that  are  variable  and  divergent  as  between 
countries.  For  esample,  oscillatory  movements  in 
the  exchange  rate  could  be produced  by  two  countries 
engaging  in  discretionary  countercyclical  monetary 
policy  but  always  in  opposite  directions,  A’s  money 
stock  expanding  when  I3>s contracts,  and  vice  versa. 
The  second  source  of  eschange  rate  volatility  iden- 
tified  by  equation  s’ is  expectational  shifts  occasioned 
by  the  appearance  of  new  information-e.g.,  an- 
nounced  changes  in  policy  targets-about  the  future 
prospects  for  various  currencies.  The  new  informa- 
tion  leads  the  market  to  revise  its  opinion  about  the 
future  costs  and  returns  from  holding  the  different 
currencies.  Reflecting  these  espectational  shifts,  ex- 
change  rates  change  until  the  existing  stocks  of  the 
various  currencies  are  again  willingly  held.  Sote 
that  exchange  rates  are  no  different  than  stock  prices 
in  this  respect.  Just  as  the  price  of  a  firm’s  stock  at 
any  moment  reflects  all  avaiIable  information  about 
the  future  profitability  of  the  firm,  so  also  does  an 
exchange  rate  embody  all  hcown  information  about 
the  future  values  of two  currencies.  New  information 
that  alters  the  market’s  perception  of  these  future 
values  will  result  in  sudden  changes  in  exchange 
rates  just  as  new  information  about  future  firm 
profitability  causes  sharp  shifts  in  a  stocli’s  price. 
Both  are  special  cases  of  the  general  rule  that,  gixzen 
new  information  about  changed  circumstances,  the 
market  price  of  any  asset -whether  equity  share  or 
unit  of  foreign  currency  or  whatever-must  change 
until  the  outstanding  stock  of  the  asset  is  willingly 
held. 
A  third  possible  source  of  exchange  rate  instability 
is  variations  in  the  ratio  of  real  incomes  (Y*/Y). 
This  factor,  however,  is deemphasized  by  monetarisrs 
who  believe  it  to  be  dominated  by  shifts  in  relative 
money  stocks  and  relative  inflationary  expectations. 
Policy  Implications  of  the  Model  This  article 
has  presented  a  monetarist  model  that  specifies 
money  stocks  and  inflationary  expectations  as  ke;\l 
determinants  of  the  exchange  rate  and  that  stresses 
the  role  of monetary  policy  in  influencing  these  deter- 
minants.  Specifically,  the  model  postulates  that 
money  stocks  are  exogenously  controlled  by  national 
central  banks  and  that  the  public’s  expecrations  about 
the  future  purchasing  power  of  various  currencies 
are  strongly  shaped  by  current  policy  actions  and 
announcements.  Several  implications  follow  from 
the  model.  It  is  well  to  remember,  however,  that 
these  implications  reflect  the  particular  assumptions 
underlying  the  model  and  that  some  of  these  assump- 
tions  are  disputable.  This  is  especially  true  of  the 
assumptions  of purchasing  power  parity,  real  interest 
rate  parity,  and  exogeneity  of  real  income.  While 
these  conditions  may  hold  in  long-run  equilibrium,. 
empirical  evidence  suggests  that  they  may  not  hold 
over  any  realistic  short-run  policy  horizon  nor  over 
the  transitional  adjustment  period  following  economic 
sllocks.  Recognition  of  this  fact  would  probably 
modify  any  policy  prescriptions  based  on  the  model. 
Subject  to these  caveats,  the  policy  implications  of the 
model  are  summarized  below. 
The  first  implication  is  that,  given  the  rate  of 
ioreign  monetary  growth,  the  most  effective  means 
of  halting  and  reversing  a  depreciation  of  the  es- 
change  rate  is  a  preannounced  permanent  reduction 
in the  rate  of  domestic  monetary  expansion.  As  new 
information,  the  announcement  itself  will  of  course 
have  an  immediate  impact  on  the  exchange  rate 
through  the  price  expectations  channel.  For  this 
impact  to be anything  more  than  temporary,  however, 
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policy  target  is  a  reliable  indicator  of  the  future 
growth  rate  of  the  money  stock.  To  convince  the 
public  of  this,  the  authorities  must  bring  the  actual 
rate  of  monetary  growth  into  conformity  with  the 
announced  target  rate  since  the  public  forms  its  ex- 
pectations  of  future  monetary  growth  at  least  partly 
on  the  basis  of the  observed  current  growth  rate.  As- 
suming  this  is done  and  the  stable  money  growth  rate 
target  is  thereafter  permanently  adhered  to,  the  ex- 
change  rate  will  continue  to  be  strengthened  through 
the  money  stock  and  price  anticipation  channels. 
A  second  policy  implication  is  that  exchange  rate 
movements  are  going  to  occur  when  domestic  mone- 
tary  policies  are  divergent  and  inconsistent  as  be- 
tween  countries.  This  can  be  demonstrated  by  re- 
writing  equation  8 as  X  =  (M/Y)  (Y*/M*)  (i/i*)“. 
As  written,  this  expression  shows  the  relationship 
between  the  exchange  rate,  its  underlying  national 
money/output  ratios,  and  of  course  the  interest  rate 
ratio.  Dissimilar  monetary  policies  (i.e.,  interna- 
tional  differences  in  rates  of  monetary  growth  per 
unit  of  real  output)  cause  the  money/output  ratios 
to  diverge.  When  this  happens  relative  inflationary 
expectations  are  also  affected,  thereby  producing 
changes  in  the  interest  rate  ratio.  These  changes 
augment  and  reinforce  the  impact  of  the  divergent 
money/output  ratios  on  the  exchange  rate.  Because 
of  these  influences,  the  exchange  rate  is  going  to 
vary  when  monetary  policies  differ  as  between  coun- 
tries. 
The  exchange  rate  will  be  stable  only  if  both 
countries  agree  to  keep  their  money/output  ratios 
constant  or  at  least  growing  at  the  same  rate.  This 
in  turn  requires  that  both  countries  abandon  diver- 
gent  policies  for  a  uniform  rule  tying  the  money 
growth  rate  to  the  growth  rate  of  real  income.  Note 
in  particular  that  within  the  context  of  the  model 
it  is  impossible  for  a  single  country  to  stabilize  the 
exchange  rate  by  adhering  to  a  monetary  rule  if  the 
other  country  persists  in  monetary  fine-tuning.  In 
short,  exchange  rate  stability  is  virtually  impossible 
when  countries  pursue  incompatible  monetary  poli- 
cies. 
A  third  policy  implication,  therefore,  is  that  policy 
coordination  or  harmonization  is the  key  to  eschange 
rate  stability.  If  two  countries  agree  to  adopt  the 
same  monetary  expansion  rule-e.g.,  a  rule  tailing 
for  a  constant  rate  of  domestic  monetary  growth 
fixed  in  relation  to  the  trend  growth  rate  of  domestic 
output-then  both  will  enjoy  the  same  long-run 
stable  domestic  inflation  rate,  and  the  floating  ex- 
change  rate  between  their  currencies  will  be  virtually 
as  constant  as  an  institutionally  fised  rate.  In  this 
case,  policy  coordination  would  allow  the  countries 
to  enjoy  the  advantages  of  a  fixed  exchange  rate 
while  retaining  some  degree  of  national  monetary 
autonomy. 
The  preceding  discussion  raises  several  questions. 
Why  is  exchange  rate  constancy  so  important  7  Is 
the  type  of  exchange  rate  regime  per  se  cruciaI  to 
the  attainment  of that  objective?  Regarding  the  first 
question,  it can  be stated  unequivocally  that  eschange 
rate  constancy  is  a  prerequisite  for  an  efficiently 
operating  international  monetary  system.  This  is 
because  money,  in  its  role  as  a  social  device  for 
economizing  on  the  use  of  scarce  resources  in  the 
generation  and  transmission  of  economic  information, 
is  most  effective  when  its  value  across  countries  is 
stable,  certain,  and  predictable.  These  qualities  of 
course  are  lacking  when  exchange  rates  fluctuate  and 
money  therefore  functions  poorly  as  a  resource- 
economizer.  In  such  situations,  traders  themselves 
must  forecast  shifts  in  the  value  of  currencies,  bear 
the  risks  of  such  shifts,  or  hire  someone  else  to  bear 
the  risks.  Either  way,  real  resources-effort,  time, 
knowledge-are  diverted  from  productive  pursuits 
into  forecasting  and  risk-taking  activities  that  would 
be  totally  unnecessary  if  exchange  rates  were  con- 
stant.  It  follows  that  the  international  economic 
system  is not  going  to  be  operating  at  peak  effic.iency 
as  long  as  exchange  rates  continue  to  fluctuate.  On 
efficiency  grounds  alone,  therefore,  exchange  rate 
constancy  is a  desirable  objective. 
As  for  the  question  of  whether  a  specific  exchange 
rate  regime-fixed  or  floating-is  crucial  to  the 
attainment  of that  objective,  the  answer  appears  to be 
in  the  negative.  The  preceding  analysis  suggests 
that  the  key  to  achieving  exchange  rate  constancy 
lies  less  in  the  way  the  foreign  exchange  market  is 
organized  than  in  finding  a  means  of  coordinating 
national  monetary  policies.  As  previously  mentioned, 
policy  coordination  in  the  form  of  the  adopt:ion  of 
uniform  rules  is required  if  exchange  rates  are  going 
to  be  constant  in  a  floating  rate  regime.  Similarly, 
some  sort  of  coordination  is necessary  in  a  fixed  rate 
regime,  otherwise  countries  might  inflate  their  do- 
mestic  money  stocks  at  different  rates  forcing  a 
breakdown  of  the  system.  To  summarize,  policy 
coordination,  not  the  exchange  rate  regime,  is  the 
sine  qua  non  for  exchange  rate  stability. 
Summary  This  article  has  presented  a  simple 
expository  model  of exchange  rate  determination  that 
incorporates  key  elements  of the  monetarist  approach. 
These  elements  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  ex- 
change  rate  is  determined  by  relative  money  stocks, 
relative  real  incomes,  and  relative  inflationary  espec- 
8  ECUNOMIC  REVIEW,  JANUARY/FEBRUARY  1977 tations,  with  the  last  variable  being  strongly  condi-  or  under-valcec  ior  long  periods.  Finally,  the  mode1 
tioned  b>: observed  rates  of  monetary  growth.  The  provides  a  use&i  framework  for  specifying  the condi- 
model  is helpful  in esplaining  exchange  rate volatility 
and  the  tendency  for  some  currencies  to  remain  over- 
tions  necessaq  for  the  attainment  of  exchange  rate 
stahilitg. 
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